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Abstract 
This paper presents progressivity breakdowns for Croatian personal income tax (henceforth PIT) in 
1997 and 2004. The decompositions reveal how the elements of the system – tax schedule, 
allowances, deductions and credits – contribute to the achievement of progressivity, over the quantiles 
of pre-tax income distribution. Through the use of ‘single parameter’ Gini indices, the social decision 
maker’s (henceforth SDM) relatively more or less favorable inclination toward taxpayers in the lower 
tails of pre-tax income distribution is accounted for. Simulations are undertaken to show how the 
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PROGRESSIVITY OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX IN CROATIA: 
DECOMPOSITION OF TAX BASE AND RATE EFFECTS 
Ivica Urban** 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The tax system is said to be progressive (proportional, regressive) when the marginal tax rate is greater 
than (equal to, less than) the average tax rate. Progressive (proportional, regressive) income tax 
system reduces (leaves unchanged, increases) income inequality. The interest in studying tax 
progressivity lies, among other things, in the welfare superiority of progressive tax over the equal-yield 
proportional tax. In other words, the former implies a smaller welfare reduction than the latter for the 
same amount of tax collected. In this paper we deal with how different components of the PIT system 
contribute to the achievement of overall progressivity. The methodology developed by Pfähler (1990) 
was later refined by Lambert (2001) and applied by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2001) in investigating 
the relative significance of various elements of the PIT system – tax schedule, allowances, deductions 
and tax credits – in determination of final progressivity in 15 OECD countries. The results showed that 
in some countries progressivity was derived almost solely from the tax schedule, allowances or tax 
credits, while in others some mixture of these elements was present. Deductions proved to have a 
negative influence on progressivity in most countries.  
This paper presents the decomposition of progressivity for the Croatian PIT system in 1997 and 2004. 
Based on the above mentioned methodology, it introduces some novelties in its application: 
progressivity component patterns are analyzed over quantiles of the relevant pre-tax income 
distributions, while through the use of ‘single parameter’ Gini indices, the social decision maker’s 
relatively more or less favorable inclination toward taxpayers in the lower tails of the pre-tax income 
distribution is also accounted for. The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, the basic 
methodology underlying progressivity measurement is presented. Section 3 contains a short overview 
of Croatian PIT system development over the period from 1997 to 2004. It continues with the analysis of 
different progressivity effects and ends with a simulation of tax burdens, undertaken to show how the 
introduction of a flat-rate system would affect PIT progressivity. Section 4 concludes. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1. Progressivity measures 
Let ( )pLX  be the Lorenz curve of pre-tax income at quantile p . If income were equally distributed, 
each fraction p  of the population would have exactly 100⋅p  percent of total pre-tax income.1 
                                                 
** I am grateful to three referees and to Peter J. Lambert for plenty of helpful comments on an earlier version of this 
paper. 
1 On measurement of income inequality and redistribution see Lambert (2001) and Duclos and Araar (2006). 
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However, they receive ( ) 100⋅pLX  percent of total pre-tax income, which is typically less than 100⋅p  
percent, and we may call the difference ( )pLp X−  an equality deficit. Analogously, we can define a 
Lorenz curve for post-tax income ( )pLN . Also, let ( )pCT  be the concentration curve for taxes and 
( )pCN  the concentration curve for post-tax income2. 
If the tax were proportional, each fraction p of the population would pay exactly ( ) 100⋅pLX  percent of 
the total tax. However, they pay only ( ) 100⋅pCT  percent of the tax (which is typically less). We may 
call the difference ( ) ( )pCpL TX −  a departure from proportionality. In the words of Lambert (2001) “the 
distance ( ) ( )pCpL TX −  is that fraction of the total tax burden shifted from low incomes (the bottom 
100⋅p  percent) to high incomes (the top ( ) 1001 ⋅− p  percent) by the presence of progression in the 
tax”. If ( ) ( )pCpL TX ≥  [ ( ) ( )pCpL TX ≤ ] for all values of p , with strict inequality holding at least 
somewhere, we say that the tax is progressive [regressive]. This approach to measurement yields what 
is called Tax-Redistribution (TR) progressivity (Pfähler, 1987). Thus, TR-progressivity of tax system 
measured at p-th quantile of the pre-tax income distribution is equal to: 
( ) ( ) ( )pCpLp TXTR −=π          (1) 
We also adopt another approach, what is called Income-Redistribution (IR) progressivity. The 100⋅p  
percent of income units with the lowest pre-tax incomes own ( ) 100⋅pLX  percent of total pre-tax 
income, but ( ) 100⋅pCN  percent of total post-tax income (which is, typically, more). Therefore, 
( ) ( )pLpC XN −  shows the fraction of total post-tax income earned by the poorest 100⋅p  percent 
income earners above their share in post-tax income that would occur under a proportional tax system. 
If ( ) ( )pLpC XN ≥  [ ( ) ( )pLpC XN ≤ ] for all values of p , with strict inequality holding at least 
somewhere, again we say that the tax is progressive [regressive]. IR-progressivity of a tax system at 
the p-th quantile of pre-tax income distribution is equal to: 
( ) ( ) ( )pLpCp XNIR −=π          (2) 
There is an important relationship between IR-progressivity and TR-progressivity, first introduced and 
proved by Kakwani (1977a, 1977b): 
( ) ( )p
t
tp TRIR ππ −= 1           (3a) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]pCpL
t
tpLpC TXXN −−=− 1        (3b) 
                                                 
2 Notice the difference between a) Lorenz curve, which shows a proportion of total sum of the variable K obtained 
by the 100⋅p  percent of the population with the lowest values of K, and b) concentration curve, which shows a 
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where t  stands for average tax rate. Kakwani’s relationship tells us that a certain amount of income 
redistribution can be achieved either with higher TR-progressivity and a lower average tax rate, or vice 
versa. Assuming that the system is progressive and pre-tax income does not change, a proportionate 
increase (or decrease) of tax liabilities, would not affect TR-progressivity but would affect IR-
progressivity.3 
2.2 Elements that cause progressivity 
Let us now turn to the definition of the tax function. First, we define the tax base iB of individual i as 
iiii DAXB −−= , where iA  represents individual i’s total tax allowances, and iD  represents 
deductions. The gross tax iG  is a (typically) piecewise linear function of the tax base (though not so in 
Germany). The net tax iT  is obtained as ii CG − , where iC  denotes the tax credits of individual i. 
Allowances (A) include basic allowance and additional allowances given according to the family-related 
or age-related characteristics of the taxpayer; in some countries they are also called ‘basic personal 
exemptions’. Deductions (D) include proportionate deductions of income and expenditure-related items, 
such as mortgage interest payments, insurances, charities, etc. 
Analogously to IR-progressivity, we may define four different IR-effects, one for each of the above-
mentioned elements: 
a) the IR-progressivity of allowances, ( )pAπ , measures disproportionality between the tax base X-A 
that would occur if only allowances existed (i.e. in the absence of deductions), and pre-tax income, 
X: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]pCpL
a
apLpCp AXXAXA −−≡−= − 1π       (4) 
b) the IR-progressivity of deductions, ( )pDπ , measures disproportionality between the tax base X-D 
that would occur if only deductions existed, and pre-tax income X: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]pCpL
d
dpLpCp DXXDXD −−≡−= − 1π       (5) 
c) the IR-progressivity of the rate structure, ( )pRπ , measures disproportionality between the actual 
tax base, reduced by gross tax (X-A-D-G), and tax base (X-A-D) itself: 
                                                                                                                                                          
proportion of total sum of the variable L obtained by the 100⋅p  percent of the population with the lowest values 
of K. 
3 If the tax system does not rerank individuals in the transition from the pre-tax to the post-tax income distribution, 
the concentration curve and Lorenz curve for post-tax income will coincide. However, in practice this is rarely the 
case, and therefore we also need to measure the reranking effect, ( ) ( ) ( )pLpCp NNRR −=π , as the departure 
from a horizontally neutral tax system, which can also be interpreted as a loss of potential redistribution. Finally, we 
can define the redistributive effect, ( ) ( ) ( )pLpLp XNRE −=π , which is comprehensive in the sense that it accounts 
both for potential redistribution and the loss due to reranking: ( ) ( ) ( )ppp RRIRRE πππ −= . 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]pCpC
gda
gpCpCp GDAXDAXGDAXR −−−−≡−= −−−−−−− 1π    (6) 
d) the IR-progressivity of tax credits, ( )pCπ , measures disproportionality between pre-tax income 
augmented by tax credits (X+C) and pre-tax income itself (X): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]pCpL
c
cpLpCp CXXCXC −+≡+−= + 1π       (7) 
Based on principles laid down by Pfähler (1990), Lambert (2001) developed a methodology for breaking 
down TR- and IR-progressivity into components that explain the contributions of the rate schedule, 
allowances and deductions to overall progressivity. In this paper the decomposition of IR-progressivity 
will be used, extended to cover also tax credits. The decomposition formula is a weighted average of 
the progressivity terms defined above: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p
cg
cp
b
dp
b
ap
g
gb
cg
gp CDAR
IR πππππ +−
+−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−−−+−= 1
111
1
  (8) 
where g , a , d , c  and b  are respectively the shares of gross tax, allowances, deductions, tax credits 
and the tax base in total pre-tax income X.4 For practical reasons, the terms ( )pAπ  and ( )pCπ  are 
replaced (in Lambert (2001), followed also by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2001)) by their negative 
counterparts, ( ) ( )pp AA πρ −=  and ( ) ( )pp CC πρ −= , which are respectively called “regressivities” of 
allowances and tax credits. Here we do the same, and (8) becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p
cg
cp
b
dp
b
ap
g
gb
cg
gp CDAR
IR ρπρππ +−
++⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−+−+−= 1
111
1
  (8b) 
The first term on the right hand side of (8b) presents the contribution to IR-progressivity of the gross tax 
liability, whereas the second term reveals the portion of progressivity attributable to tax credits. 
Although they are obvious from equation (8b), for easier reference later we will now identify the 
following quantile measures, to describe the contributions of the following four elements to overall IR-
progressivity: the rate structure effect, the allowance effect, the deductions effect, and the tax credit 
effect (9): 
( ) ( )p
g
gb
cg
gpE R
IR
R π−+−= 1 , ( ) ( )pb
a
cg
gpE A
IR
A ρ−+−=
1
1
,    
 ( ) ( )p
b
d
cg
gpE D
IR
D π−+−−=
1
1
, ( ) ( )p
cg
cpE C
IR
C ρ+−
+=
1
1
    (9) 
 
                                                 
4 Note that the average net tax rate, t , is equal to cgt −= . Throughout the text the term “average tax rate” is 
synonymous with “average net tax rate”. 
 9
2.3 Inequality indices 
So far, we have measured progressivity effects as distances between relevant Lorenz and 
concentration curves at different quantiles of the income distribution. To obtain aggregate measures of 
progressivity, these distances can be summed up using any desired weighting scheme. One such 
scheme, ( )pw , gives different weights to distances occurring at different quantiles of the distribution, 
thus expressing the ethical attitudes of the observer. This type of scheme, first proposed by Mehran 
(1976), gives us a family of linear inequality indices, Ι : 
( )[ ] ( )dppwpLpI XX ∫ −=
1
0
         (10) 
The index in (10) represents inequality of pre-tax income. However, the term ( )pLp X−  in (10) can be 
replaced by any one of the rank differences mentioned above. In the analysis that follows, we 
concentrate on one special case, that of the so-called single parameter Gini indices of inequality by 
Donaldson and Weymark (1980), for which the weights are defined as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )211, −−−== ννννκ pppw         (11) 
where 1≥ν . These weights are illustrated in Figure 1 for several values of the ethical parameter ν . 
Observe several cases: 
a) 1=ν  → ( ) 0, =νκ p  for every p  → 0=XI  → no inequality is observed, whatever the distribution 
of incomes. 
b) 2=ν  → ( ) 2, =νκ p  for every p  → XX GI = , where XG  represents the standard Gini 
coefficient. 
c) 21 <<ν  → ( )νκ ,p  is increasing in p  giving larger ethical weights to equality deficits felt at 
higher ps. 
d) 2>ν  → ( )νκ ,p  is decreasing in p  thus giving larger ethical weights to equality deficits felt at 
lower ps. 
Our single parameter measure of inequality, or S-Gini coefficient for pre-tax income, is defined as 
follows: 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )dpppLpG XX νκν ,
1
0
∫ −=         (12) 
Analogously to (12), from (1) and (2) we obtain the indices of TR- and IR-progressivity: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )dpppCpL TXTR νκνπ ,
1
0
∫ −= ; ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )dpppLpC XNIR νκνπ ,
1
0
∫ −=    (13) 
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Similarly, from (9) indices of the rate structure effect, ( )νIRRE , the allowance effect, ( )νIRAE , deductions 
effect, ( )νIRDE , and tax credit effect, ( )νIRCE , are obtained. Henceforth, we refer to all of these indices, 
which are based upon the S-Gini index of income inequality, as S-indices (of progressivity and its 
components).5 
Figure 1 Weights for calculation of single-parameter indices 
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In the introduction it was said that progressivity is related to social welfare. Here we show that a 
progressive tax delivers more social welfare than an equal-yield proportionate tax; or put differently, the 
progressive tax can collect more revenue for identical social welfare than a proportionate tax. Denote 
with XW , NW , 
ETYP
NW
,  and ESWPNW
,  the social welfare6 values associated with the pre-tax income 
distribution, post-tax income distribution, distribution of income after the equal-yield proportional income 
tax and distribution of income after the proportional income tax that yields the same social welfare as 
actual post-tax income distribution. 
[ ]XX GW −= 1μ , ( )[ ]NN GtW −−= 11μ ,      
 ( )[ ]XETYPN GtW −−= 11, μ ; ( )[ ]XESWPESWPN GtW −−= 11 ,, μ     (14) 
where μ  is the mean pre-tax income, t  is actual average tax rate and ESWPt ,  is proportional tax rate 
that would achieve the same social welfare as the actual post-tax income distribution. It can be seen 
(Lambert, 2001, and similarly in Duclos et al, 2003) that: 
( ) IRETYPNN tWW πμ −=− 1,          (15) 
                                                 
5 Duclos and Tabi (1995) apply S-Gini indices for measuring distribution and redistribution of income in Canada. 
6 See Appendix B on measurement of social welfare. 
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Thus, if income tax is progressive ( 0>IRπ ), it will cause a smaller reduction of social welfare in the 
transition from pre-tax to post-tax income than an equal-yield proportional tax. We can express this 
welfare premium more suitably in terms of ETYPNW
, , and obtain the Blackorby-Donaldson index of 
inequality7: 
X
IR
ETYP
N
ETYP
NNBD
GW
WW
−=
−=
1,
, ππ          (16) 
Similarly, from (14) we can obtain an index of tax revenue premium8 ( TRPπ ) that shows us, in terms of 
pre-tax income, how much more tax revenue can be collected due to progressivity compared to an 
identical-welfare proportional tax: 
( )
X
IR
ESWPTRP
G
ttt −
−=−=
1
1, ππ          (17) 
3. ANALYSIS 
3.1 Personal income tax in Croatia 
New PIT legislation that replaced the system inherited from the ex-socialist state was introduced in 
1994. The tax schedule consisted of two brackets, and the corresponding rates were 20% and 35%. 
Taxable income included wages and salaries, pensions, income from self-employment and rents. In 
2001 there came several major changes: a) dividends were included into taxable income9; b) the use of 
separate schedules for some sorts of income was allowed; c) a number of deductions and special 
allowances were introduced for certain groups of taxpayers. The tax schedule was also changed, to 
contain three brackets, with corresponding tax rates of 15%, 25% and 35%. In 2003 new reliefs were 
introduced, together with a fourth bracket with a rate of 45%. More detailed description of the system is 
given in Table 1. 
Table 1 Basics of PIT system in Croatia 
Personal Allowance 
1997 
1. Basic: 9,600 kuna (all except pensioners); 24,000 kuna (pensioners) 
2. For dependents: 2,900 kuna (one child); 6,700 kuna (two children); etc.  
2004 
1. Basic: 18,000 kuna (all except pensioners); 30,600 kuna (pensioners) 
2. For dependents: 7,560 kuna (one child); 18,180 kuna (two children); etc. 
 
                                                 
7 Blackorby and Donaldson (1984). 
8 Created for purposes of subsequent analysis in this paper. 
9 Dividends are excluded from taxation by the Law from 2005. 
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Other allowances and deductions 
1997 
none 
2004 
1. Premiums for life-, additional health- and voluntary pension insurance (up to 12,600 kuna) 
2. Exemption for persons who carry out an artistic or cultural activity (up to 20,000 kuna) 
3. Additional personal allowance for people living in ASNC* (15,000-30,000 kuna) 
4. Exemption for self-employed who live in ASNC (25%, 50% or 75% of pre-tax income) 
5. Employment incentives – wages of newly employed workers and apprentices (limited by income) 
6. Expenditures for research and development (limited by income) 
7. Outlays made for education and skill-development of employees (limited by income) 
8. Accelerated depreciation (limited by income) 
9. Health protection and medical treatment outlays; health insurance (up to 12,000 kuna) 
10. Dwelling acquisition or improvement costs; paid rent and mortgage (up to 12,000 kuna) 
11. Gifts for cultural, educational, humanitarian and other purposes (up to 2% of total revenue) 
Standardized Costs 
1997 
1. Rental income: 30-50% of receipts 
2004 
1. Rental income: 30-50% of receipts 
2. Income from part-time and contractual work: 25-55% of receipts 
Standard tax schedule 
1997 
0-28,800 kuna: 20%; >28,800 kuna: 35% 
2004 
0-36,000 kuna: 15%; 36,000- 81,000 kuna: 25%; 81,000-252,000: 35%; >252,000 kuna: 45% 
Special tax schedules** 
1997 
none 
2004 
1. Rental income: 15% 
2. Income from part-time and contractual work: 35% 
3. Royalties & income from sale of real estates: 35% 
4. Dividends: 15% 
Tax credits 
1997 
none 
2004 
1. Tax credits for war veterans 
* ASNC – the areas of special national concern 
** Final withholding 
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Personal allowances consist of a basic allowance (BA), and an additional allowance for dependents 
(DA). Throughout the whole period, BA grew faster than average income, and dependent allowance 
factors10 were also increased. A specific characteristic of the PIT system in all years is that for 
pensioners a separate basic allowance was set, at a level almost twice as high as that of the general 
BA. The consequence is that only one in ten pensioners actually pay PIT; pensioners made up 33% 
(40%) of the whole population of PIT payers in 1997 (2004). Whereas they held 19% (27%) of total 
income, they contributed less than 2% of the total tax revenue in both years. Because of this dual 
treatment of taxpayers, and since a significant increase in the number of pensioners occurred over the 
period due to early retirement, it was decided to perform separate analyses for two samples: one 
excluding pensioners, and another in which all taxpayers are covered.  
In the following analysis, under the term allowances (A) we consider the sum of BA and DA. Obligatory 
contributions to the social security funds are not a part of income subject to taxation, and therefore they 
were not analyzed. Deductions (D) capture all other reliefs that reduce the tax base, shown in Table 1 
under “other allowances and deductions” and “standardized costs”. Among tax credits (C), there was 
only one such relief, in 2004, but it was negligible in amount. The tax unit is the individual. For purposes 
of comparability across years, income from dividends has been excluded from the analysis.11 
3.2 Data 
As part of a research project on redistributional aspects of the Croatian personal income tax and social 
security contributions, databases for personal income in 1997-2004 have been compiled.12 They are 
4.3-5% representative samples from the respective populations of PIT payers, containing, for each 
taxpayer: gross income by source, social security contributions paid by the employee, personal income 
tax paid, and the amounts of allowances and deductions. The following analysis draws upon these 
databases, which, after (before) exclusion of pensioners, contained data for 68,552 (102,555) and 
71,421 (119,344) taxpayers in 1997 and 2004, respectively. 
3.3 Progressivity and redistributive effect 
Figure 2 shows TR- and IR-progressivity measures for Croatian PIT in 1997 and 2004, estimated at 
each percentile.13 Comparing the two figures, we observe opposing trends: while TR-progressivity is 
higher in 2004 for all quantiles above p=0.25, IR-progressivity is higher in 1997, for all p<0.92. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 DA=k*BA, where k is the so-called ‘dependent allowance factor’. The value of k depends on the number of 
children and other dependent members of the family. 
11 Dividends make about 2% of total pre-tax income in 2004, belonging exclusively to 10% top income-earners. 
12 These micro data were compiled with the permission, help and support of the Tax Administration.  
13 Priority in presentation of results is given to the reduced sample (without pensioners), but a short comparison 
with the results obtained for the full sample is given at the end of this section.  
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Figure 2 TR-progressivity and IR-progressivity by percentile 
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What do the progressivity curves for 1997 and 2004 tell us? In the case of TR-progressivity, if the tax 
were proportional, the progressivity curve would coincide with the x-axis, because each quantile’s share 
in total tax would be equal to its share in pre-tax income. However, when the tax is progressive, the 
progressivity curve lies above the x-axis. In 1997, for example, TR-progressivity at p=0.8 is equal to 
0.187. If the share of the poorest 80% taxpayers in total pre-tax income were s%, under the proportional 
system they would pay s% of total tax; instead, they pay (s-18.7)% of total tax. Progressivity elements 
of the PIT system thus shifted 18.7% of the total PIT burden from the poorest 80% taxpayers onto the 
shoulders of the richest 20%.14 The difference between 2004 and 1997 TR-progressivity equals, for 
example, 0.093 at p=0.95. It means that in 2004 the poorest 95% taxpayers shifted 9.3% of total PIT (of 
that year) more than in 1997 to the richest 5%. On the other hand, IR-progressivity tells us how a 
departure from proportionality in taxation affects distribution of post-tax income. Again, if tax is 
progressive, the IR-progressivity curve will lie above the x-axis. For example, in 1997 (2004), IR-
progressivity at p=0.5 amounted to 0.021 (0.017). This means that the poorest half of taxpayers receive 
2.1% (1.7%) more total post-tax income than they would receive under proportional taxation. 
As equations (3a) and (3b) show, the two measures of progressivity are connected through the average 
tax rate. Increased concentration of taxes compared to pre-tax income (measured by TR-progressivity) 
could not compensate for a large decrease of the average tax rate over the period and bring the 
redistributive effect (measured by IR-progressivity) in 2004 to the level from 1997. The average tax rate, 
as can be seen from Table 215, fell by one third over the period. The reasons are twofold; one is the 
declining share of the tax base in pre-tax income, due to increasing allowances and deductions, and the 
other, the declining tax-to-base ratio that stems from changes in marginal tax rates and definitions of tax 
brackets (see further for more details). 
 
                                                 
14 Quantile *p , at which TR-progressivity reaches the maximum, divides the taxpayers into two groups: those 
whose rank is *pp <  pay less than the average tax rate, and those whose rank is *pp >  pay more than the 
average tax rate. The value of *p  increased from 0.82 in 1997 to 0.86 in 2004. 
15 Appendix C summarizes basic descriptive statistics of income, allowances and tax. 
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Table 2 PIT elements – shares in pre-tax income and concentrations 
 1997 2004 
 Whole sample Sample without pensioners Whole sample 
Sample without 
pensioners 
Share in pre-tax income     
allowance (a) 46.1 36.9 54.3 44.3 
deductions (d) 0.4 0.3 5.1 6.2 
tax credits (c)   0.0 0.0 
tax base (b) 53.5 62.7 40.6 49.5 
net tax (t) 12.3 14.8 8.2 10.2 
t / b 23.0 23.6 20.1 20.6 
Gini/concentration coefficientsa     
pre-tax income (GX) 0.440 0.414 0.454 0.429 
post-tax income (GN) 0.402 0.378 0.424 0.398 
allowance (CA) 0.160 0.154 0.220 0.198 
deductions (CD) 0.578 0.494 0.634 0.499 
tax base (CB) 0.681 0.566 0.744 0.626 
gross tax (CG) 0.718 0.621 0.791 0.701 
tax credit (CC)   0.886 0.877 
net tax (CT) 0.718 0.621 0.791 0.701 
a These are regular Gini and concentration coefficients; they are equivalent to S-Gini indices of inequality and 
concentration for 2=ν . 
Table 3 shows the global S-indices of IR- and TR-progressivity obtained for ν -values ranging from 1.1 
to 5. For all 5.1≥ν , IR-progressivity dominates in 1997, and for all ν  TR-progressivity is larger in 
2004. IR-progressivity is higher in 2004 for 1.1=ν , but the difference is not significant at the 5% level 
( 05.0=α ).16 17 
Table 3 Indices of IR- and TR-progressivity 
 ( )νπ IR  ( )νπ TR  
ν  1997 2004 differencea (2004-1997) 1997 2004 difference
a 
(2004-1997) 
1.1 0.0101 0.0105 0.0004_ 0.0585 0.0925 0.0340* 
1.5 0.0294 0.0271 -0.0023* 0.1695 0.2397 0.0702* 
2.0 0.0361 0.0309 -0.0052* 0.2082 0.2726 0.0644* 
3.0 0.0370 0.0291 -0.0079* 0.2134 0.2567 0.0433* 
5.0 0.0319 0.0227 -0.0092* 0.1838 0.2004 0.0166* 
a Differences significant at the 5% level ( 05.0=α ) are indicated by *. 
                                                 
16 Bootstrap methodology described in Anderson et al (2003) is used to test statistical significance of the results. 
See Appendix B for details about this. 
17 Reranking is relatively small in both year and reaches about 2% of IR-progressivity for a wide range of values of 
the ethical parameter. 
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Table 4 presents S-Gini indices of pre-tax income, ( )νXG , which show that income inequality has 
unambiguously grown over the period.18 Blackorby-Donaldson indices show that the inequality-reducing 
power of the PIT system has weakened. These indices can be interpreted in the following way: for 
example, in 1997 the index for SDM with 2=ν  tells us that the actual system, due to its IR-
progressivity, enabled 6.2% more (post-tax) welfare than an equal-yield proportional tax. We can see 
that this ‘welfare premium from progression’ rises as the ethical parameter is increased. Looked at from 
a different angle, for the same after-tax welfare, the progressive tax system enables a higher tax 
revenue than the proportional system. For example, ask the following question: If SDM with 2=ν  in 
1997 wanted to apply proportionate tax and achieve same post-tax social welfare as the actual, what 
would be the tax rate? The answer is: (actual average tax rate minus ( ) 1002 ⋅TRPπ  percent) = 14.8% - 
5.2% = 9.6%. 
Table 4 Indices of welfare premium and tax revenue premium 
 ( )νXG  ( )νπ BD  ( )νπ TRP  
ν  1997 2004 1997 2004 1997 2004 
1.1 0.0794 0.0853 0.0110 0.0115 0.0093 0.0103 
1.5 0.2784 0.2917 0.0407 0.0383 0.0347 0.0344 
2.0 0.4135 0.4286 0.0616 0.0541 0.0524 0.0486 
3.0 0.5593 0.5762 0.0840 0.0687 0.0715 0.0617 
5.0 0.6968 0.7154 0.1052 0.0798 0.0896 0.0716 
3.4 Progressivity decomposition 
Figure 3 shows the decomposition of IR-progressivity across quantiles of the pre-tax income 
distribution. First to state something about general relationship between the various effects: the 
allowance effect is about 6-7 times more intensive than the rate effect on the median, but as we 
approach top quantiles the relative contributions of the allowance and rate effects converge to 50%. 
The deductions effect is invisible in 1997, but had increased to negative 3% of overall IR-progressivity 
in 2004. Tax credit effect is negligible in 2004 due to its small share in pre-tax income, and therefore we 
ignore it in further analysis. Despite numerous changes in the PIT system during the period, its main 
redistributive patterns remained the same, with allowances as the strongest progressivity enhancing 
element, followed by the rate structure. However, as already mentioned above, its redistributive power 
has weakened. The following analysis tries to explain how different elements contributed to the 
declining redistributive effect. 
 
 
                                                 
18 For more on income inequality in Croatia, see Nestić (2005) and Čok and Urban (2006). 
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Figure 3 IR-progressivity decomposition by percentile 
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Note: quantile effects are defined in formula (9); A – allowance effect; R – rate effect; D – deductions effect 
Three main changes in Croatian PIT happened between 1997 and 2004: a) personal allowance was 
doubled (while mean pre-tax income grew by 65%); b) rate structure became steeper with highest 
(lowest) marginal tax rate changed from 35% to 45% (20% to 15%); c) a number of deductions were 
introduced, all of them being income-elastic (i.e. they are more concentrated than pre-tax income). All 
these changes had different impacts on concentration and relative magnitudes of allowances, 
deductions and net tax, and consequently, on IR-progressivity. Higher allowances and deductions 
eroded the tax base, which fell from 62.7% to 49.5% of pre-tax income, as can be seen in Table 2, 
almost half of this drop being attributable to deductions. The decrease of the tax base could have been 
compensated by a corresponding rise of marginal tax rates, but this has not happened. Moreover, the 
opposite trend occurred: as Figure 4 shows, average tax rate as a function of the tax base (denoted as 
( )Bu ) is lower in 2004 for all amounts less than 325 thousand kuna. Only the 0.2% richest taxpayers 
have a tax base higher than this and although they contribute 5.4% of the total tax base, an increase of 
their marginal tax rate could not compensate for lower average rates at tax bases below 325 thousands 
kuna. As a final result, the average tax rate ( t ) fell from 0.148 to 0.102 or by 31%.  
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Figure 4 Average and marginal tax rates as functions of tax base 
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Notes: u(B)=T/B; m(B)=dT/dB; where T is tax liability and B is tax base 
Relaxation of the fall in IR-progressivity due to a large decrease of the average tax rate could have 
come from three sources: lower concentration of allowances, higher share of allowances in pre-tax 
income (a ), and more progressive (steeper) tax schedule19. The first two sources are actually 
conradictory: from Table 2 we can see that the concentration of allowances (CA) has increased, which is 
caused by a large increase of the ‘nominal’ amount of personal allowance: a larger number of people 
simply cannot use the whole amount to which they have right.20 In Figure 3 we see that the allowance 
effect in 1997 is smaller than in 2004 at all quantiles, and that the rate effect is smaller for all but the 
highest income ranks. However, both effects fell by only 12% on average across the pre-tax income 
quantiles, compared to a 31% fall in the average tax rate. Thus, the increased share of allowances in 
pre-tax income (a ) and the increased progressivity of rate structure did compensate for part of the IR-
progressivity fall. Lastly, there is negative deductions effect that further prevents the PIT system in 2004 
from achieving 1997 IR-progressivity. 
We now turn to shares of allowance, rate structure, and deductions effects in S-indices of IR-
progressivity, which are presented in Figure 5 for a wide range of ν -values, and obtained for both 
reduced and full samples (denoted respectively as ‘rs’ and ‘fs’ in the figure). We shall concentrate first 
on the results for the reduced samples. Two main factors of progressivity, the allowances and rate 
structure, have opposite trends as the ethical parameter increases. The share of the allowance effect 
for both years is increasing in ν  and at some point reaches the value 0.8, meaning that 80% of 
                                                 
19 Tax schedule in 2004 indeed obtains significantly greater elasticity for all values of tax base (except on small 
interval of 31,000-36,000 kuna, where elasticity was slightly greater in 1997). 
20 Suppose that persons P and Q have pre-tax incomes of $100 and $200. If ‘nominal’ allowance is set to $100, 
then both persons fully use it and the allowance is absolutely equally distributed. But, if ‘nominal’ allowance is 
increased to $150, then P still uses $100 and Q uses $150, and therefore concentration of allowances is increased. 
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progressivity is attributed to allowances. On the other hand, the share of the rate effect in progressivity 
increases from 0.2 to 0.4 as we move to the left along the x-axis. To explain these trends we must 
remember that the majority of the rate effect is obtained at the upper quantiles of the distribution (Figure 
3), to which S-indices with high values of ν  give much less importance.  
Why do we care about these shares estimated for a wide range of ethical parameter? For example, 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2001) calculate the shares only for 2=ν  and compare the results for 15 
countries. However, the choice of value 2=ν  is no less arbitrary and more self-evident than any other 
choice.21 Here, in case of Croatia we could choose 3=ν  and conclude that the allowance effect is key 
element in achieving progressivity. Equally so, choosing 5.1=ν  we could well conclude that PIT is 
progressive due to the even mixture of allowance and rate effect. Therefore, Lambert (1999) suggests 
the use of S-Gini indices in international and intertemporal comparisons as a way in which “robustness 
of conclusions derived using the regular Gini-based [progressivity measures] can be tested”. 
Figure 5 Shares of allowance, rate structure and deductions effects in overall IR-progressivity, as 
functions of ν  
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Note: ‘rs’=reduced sample; ‘fs’=full sample 
Another factor that can lead to misleading comparisons is population coverage. Figure 5 reveals that 
the shares of the effects in total IR-progressivity are significantly different if the full sample (one that 
includes pensioners) is analyzed. Here, we see that the allowance effect is far larger, and at the 
expense of the rate effect, while the share of the deductions effect is about twice as big. The supremacy 
                                                 
21 Duclos and Tabi (1995) limit their choice of ν  to a maximum 4, based on the ‘leaky bucket experiment’, this leak 
reflecting “the feature that tax and benefit programmes often generate efficiency losses which are nevertheless 
tolerated because these programmes can enhance the equity of the income distribution making it less unequal”. 
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of the allowance effect is due to pensioners’ high personal allowance, which results in only small 
percentage of pensioners actually facing a tax schedule. 
3.5 Further analysis: simulation 
From the findings above, we reach the conclusion that SDMs with different ethical considerations will 
value differently the contributions of PIT elements in achieving progressivity. Those with higher (lower) 
values of ethical parameter will attribute more relative importance to the allowance effect (rate effect). 
One evident application of the knowledge about what makes a PIT progressive is related to tax reform. 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2001) mention the case of an SDM who uses the rate structure to 
influence progressivity. If the current rate effect is low, then even a significant increase in the 
progressivity of the rate structure would not help to bring a desired increase in overall progressivity. 
Another interesting example is the introduction of a flat-rate PIT, accompanied by the abolition of all or 
many of the exemptions and deductions. Based on our findings in respect of the Croatian PIT, we are 
tempted to conclude that the single rate system could achieve much of (if not even more than) the 
existing progressivity as defined by our S-indices. However, there are certain restraints to such 
conclusions, which the following exercise will highlight.  
Imagine that a current PIT system is replaced by a quite simple one with a single personal allowance, 
equal for all taxpayers, and with no other allowances or deductions. There is only one marginal rate, 
and the system has to be revenue-neutral. There is an unlimited set of combinations of allowance and 
marginal rate that would satisfy the given condition, but we set a second condition: that the system must 
be ( )νπ IR -neutral. We call this alternative tax scheme “unique allowance-single rate” (henceforth 
UASR) system in what follows. Thus, the IR-progressivity of the simulated system must be the same as 
of the actual one, for the chosen ν -value. It must be recalled that it is not the policy recommendation of 
this paper that policy makers should replace the actual system with this one; moreover, the modeled 
system is very simplistic (and rather unrealistic), but as such serves its main purpose, which is to offer a 
supplement to conclusions reached using progressivity decomposition formulas.22 
Denote by η  the amount of nominal personal allowance for each taxpayer.23 The S-index of IR-
regressivity of the allowance achieved with η  is obtained by integrating in negative counterpart of (4)24: 
( ) ( ) ( )dpppAA κρνρ ηη ∫=
1
0
         (18) 
                                                                                                                                                          
For example, the maximum tolerable leak of transferring 1$ from the person whose individual rank is pj=2/3 in the 
income distribution to person whose rank is pi=1/3 amounts to 87.5 cents for SDM with 4=ν . 
22 Discussions about flat-rate PIT introduction in Croatia were rather sporadic. However, this exercise might provide 
some insights for SDM in other countries that might be contemplating such a move, or have already established a 
flat-rate system. 
23 The allowance of taxpayer i is thus η=iA  if η≥iX  and ii XA =  if η<iX . 
24 Remember that the “regressivity” of allowance is equal to negative progressivity of allowance, ( ) ( )pp AA πρ −= . 
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Because there are no tax credits and deductions, and there is no rate structure either, the index of IR-
progressivity of the flat-rate system, ( )νπ FIR ,  will be equal to the allowance effect. Thus, from (3a) and 
(18) we have that: 
( ) ( )νρνπ ηAF
F
FIR
t
t
−= 1
,          (19) 
where Ft  is the average tax rate of the flat-rate system. Rearranging (19) and setting conditions 
( ) ( )νπνπ AIRFIR ,, =  and AF tt = , where ( )νπ AIR,  and At  are respectively the IR-progressivity and 
average tax rate of the actual system, we obtain (20), which calculates the index of regressivity of 
allowances, achieved with nominal allowance *η , at which the IR-progressivities of the flat and actual 
systems are the same: 
( ) ( )νπνρη AIRA
A
A t
t ,* 1−=          (20) 
The simulation goes as follows: using the distribution of pre-tax incomes, we calculate values of ( )νρηA  
for a wide range of η -values and we then look for ( )νρη*A . The needed single tax rate *ϕ  is then 
obtained as */* ηϕ bt A= , where *ηb  is ratio of the tax base to total pre-tax income when *ηη = . 
The simulation is done for the pre-tax income distribution of 2004, for several values of the ethical 
parameter. The rows of Table 5 present the unique allowance and single tax rate required for three IR-
progressivity neutral UASR models, at 5.1=ν , 2=ν  and 3=ν , called M1-M3 respectively. For 
example, model M3 equalizes the IR-progressivity of the UASR system at 3=ν  with the IR-
progressivity of the actual system obtained for the same ethical parameter. 
Table 5 UASR models for 2004 
Model Condition 
Unique 
allowance 
( *α ) 
Flat tax 
rate 
( *ϕ ) 
IR-progress. ( )5.1IRπ  IR-progress. ( )2IRπ  IR-progress. ( )3IRπ  
M1 ( ) ( )5.15.1 ,, AIRFIR ππ =  31,590 0.2277 0.0271 0.0345 0.0361 
M2 ( ) ( )22 ,, AIRFIR ππ =  27,960 0.2058 0.0238 0.0309 0.0333 
M3 ( ) ( )33 ,, AIRFIR ππ =  23,480 0.1816 0.0195 0.0259 0.0291 
Table 5 shows that the models with a lower value of the ethical parameter require a higher allowance 
(and, naturally, a higher single tax rate), and achieve unambiguously higher IR-progressivity than those 
with a higher value of the ethical parameter, as can also be seen from Figure 6. At the first sight, the 
conclusion that the SDM with lower value of ν  will ask for more progressive tax than the SDM with 
higher ν  seems to be contradictory. We have seen earlier that all SDM’s with 1>ν  are ‘progressivity 
lovers’ in sense that for all of them progressive tax delivers a welfare premium compared to an equal-
yield proportionate tax; they only differ in degree of this feeling, in the sense that the welfare premium 
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increases in ν . The case shown in Table 5 is no exception: ( ) ( ) ( )5.123 IRIRIR πππ >>  for all three 
models, M1-M3. The reason for an SDM with lower value ν  asking for relatively more progressivity in a 
simulated system lies in his perception of the progressivity of the actual system. We have seen that an 
SDM with low (high) values of ν  attributes greater relative significance to progressivity obtained at 
higher (lower) quantiles of pre-tax distribution. The actual system achieves most of its progressivity at 
the highest quantiles, largely thanks to progressive rate structure that, of course, does not exist in 
UASR models. The only way available way for an SDM with low ν  to compensate for lack of 
progressive rates is to increase the personal allowance, and thus achieve more elastic tax function. 
Figure 6 Progressivity of actual system and simulated UASR system in 2004 by percentile 
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Lambert (2001) says that “popular analysis [of income tax reform] begins, and often ends, by identifying 
the pattern of gainers and losers when taxes are changed”.25 Here we end with the analysis of change 
in tax burdens caused by three UASR models. Figure 7 presents changes in the average tax rate that 
would occur under these alternative tax systems compared to the actual system, with positive changes 
representing an increase in tax burden and vice versa. Again we face a contradictory result: due to 
larger personal allowance, the model M1, based on lowest ν , creates tax cuts for the largest number of 
lower-income people and the smallest number of people with highest incomes (and smallest cuts for 
this group), among all three models. 
 
 
                                                 
25 One such analysis is provided for current PIT system in Croatia by Urban (2006). 
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Figure 7 Difference between the average tax rate for simulated UASR system and actual system in 
2004 by percentile 
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4. CONCLUSION 
This paper analyzed various redistributional aspects of Croatian personal income tax from 1997 to 
2004. Progressivity was decomposed using the methodology proposed by Pfähler (1990) and further 
elaborated by Lambert (2001). The breakdowns reveal how different elements of the PIT system, that 
is, the rate structure, allowances, deductions and tax credits, contribute to the achievement of overall 
progressivity. It is shown that the patterns of progressivity, and the effects of the elements which cause 
it, vary over the quantiles of the pre-tax income distribution. Quantile analysis thus has an advantage 
over scalar measures, such as the standard Gini-based measures of income inequality (Gini 
coefficient), and of progressivity (Reynolds-Smolensky and Kakwani indices). However, in this paper 
scalar measures are also used, so-called S-indices, which have been purpose-designed in terms of 
single parameter Gini and concentration indices, where the parameter expresses the SDM’s ethical 
judgments. For different choices of the ethical parameter underpinning the S-indices, comparison of 
results obtained for different time periods (countries) will bring different results. Also, the conclusions 
about the relative contributions of PIT elements to progressivity are sensitive to the coverage of 
population that is analyzed. 
The redistributive power of Croatian PIT fell over the period, thanks to the lower average tax rate, and in 
spite of the increased concentration of taxes as compared to the inequality of pre-tax income. On 
average, the largest share of progressivity can be attributed to allowances, while the rate structure is 
more important at the upper quantiles. Deductions, as in other countries, have a negative contribution to 
progressivity. Tax credits are a negligible element of the Croatian personal income tax system. 
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The applicability of this kind of analysis was recognized by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2001), who 
calculated and compared progressivity decompositions of PIT systems in 15 OECD countries. For a 
country planning a tax reform, it is important to know how progressivity is achieved in the current 
system. Based on that, some recommendations can be given on possible paths for reform. It is shown 
that a simple flat-rate revenue-neutral system could preserve progressivity. Parameters of this system, 
allowance and single rate, would depend upon the ethical stance of the SDMs: those relatively less 
(more) favorably inclined to the lower tail of the pre-tax income distribution will choose a higher (lower) 
allowance and a higher (lower) single tax rate.  
 25
REFERENCES 
Anderson, J. E., Ghosh Roy, A. and Shoemaker, P. A., 2003. “Confidence Intervals for the Suits 
Index”, National Tax Journal, 56 (1), 81-91. 
Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D., 1984. “Ethical social index numbers and the measurement of 
effective tax/benefit progressivity”. Canadian Journal of Economics, 17 (4), 683-694. 
Čok, M. and Urban, I., 2006. “Distribution of income and taxes in Slovenia and Croatia”. Working 
paper, No. 180. Ljubljana: Faculty of Economics. 
Donaldson, D. and Weymark, J. A., 1980. “A Single Parameter Generalization of the Gini Indices of 
Inequality”. Journal of Economic Theory, 22, 67–86. 
Duclos, J.-Y. and Araar, A., 2006. “Poverty and Equity Measurement, Policy and Estimation with DAD” 
[online]. Available from: [http://132.203.59.36/DAD/manual/theory.htm]. 
Duclos, J.-Y., and Tabi, M., 1995. “Linear Inequality Measures and the Redistribution of Income”. 
Working paper, No. 9613. Quebec: Laval University. 
Duclos, J.-Y., Jalbert, V. and Araar, A., 2003. “Classical horizontal inequity and reranking: an 
integrated approach”. Research on Economic Inequality, 10, 65–100. 
Kakwani, N. C., 1977a. “Applications of Lorenz Curves in Economic Analysis”. Econometrica, 45 (3), 
719-728. 
Kakwani, N. C., 1977b. “Measurement of Progressivity: An International Comparison”. The Economic 
Journal, 87 (345), 71-80. 
Lambert, P. J., 1999. “Redistributional effects of progressive income taxes” in: J. Silber, ed. Handbook 
on Income Inequality Measurement. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 485-509. 
Lambert, P. J., 2001. The Distribution and Redistribution of Income. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
Mehran, F., 1976. “Linear measures of income inequality”. Econometrica, 44 (4), 805-809. 
Nestić, D., 2005. “Income distribution in Croatia: what do the household budget survey data tell us?” 
[online]. Financial Theory and Practice”. Financijska teorija i praksa, 29 (1), 39-53. Available from:: 
[http://www.ijf.hr/eng/FTP/2005/1/nestic.pdf]. 
Pfähler, W., 1987. “Redistributive effects of tax progressivity: evaluating a general class of aggregate 
measures”. Public Finance/Finances Publiques, 42 (1), 1-31. 
Pfähler, W., 1990. “Redistributive Effect of Income Taxation: Decomposing Tax Base and Tax Rates 
Effects”. Bulletin of Economic Research, 42 (2), 121-29. 
Urban, I., 2006. “A single rate of personal income tax: the impact on the distribution of the tax burden” 
[online]. Newsletter, No. 24. Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance. Available from: 
[http://www.ijf.hr/eng/newsletter/24.pdf]. 
Wagstaff, A. and van Doorslaer, E., 2001. “What Makes the Personal Income Tax Progressive? A 
Comparative Analysis of Fifteen OECD Countries”. International Tax and Public Finance, 8 (3), 299-
315. 
 26
APPENDIX  
A. S-Gini social welfare function 
S-Gini social welfare function aggregates individual incomes in the following way: 
( ) ( ) ( )dpppQW ∫=
1
0
,νων          (21) 
where ( ) ( ) 11, −−= νννω pp  is a weighting scheme with single-parameter ν . Figure A1 illustrates 
( )νω ,p  for several values of the ethical parameter ν . For 1=ν  the weights are equal to 1 for all 
individuals, and in this case welfare is identical to per capita income, a common aggregate measure of 
society’s living standard. For 1>ν , weights are decreasing in p , such that ( ) ννω == ,0p  and 
( ) 0,1 == νω p . Also observe that ( ) 1,1
0
=∫ dpp νω , i.e. the weights sum up to 1. As Duclos and Araar 
(2006) show, the S-Gini social welfare function can also be expressed using Lorenz curve and 
weighting scheme ( )ρκ ;p , where μ  is the average actual income: 
( ) ( ) ( )dpppLW ∫=
1
0
,νκμν          (22) 
Figure A1 Weights for S-Gini social welfare function 
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Suppose that an SDM is aiming to achieve a purely egalitarian society (i.e. one in which all people have 
the same income). This would be done by progressive taxation of rich and transfers to poor. In this 
process, people would certainly lose part of their incentive to earn income and total income would fall 
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below the current. Let ξ  be the income of each individual in an egalitarian society in which the welfare 
would be the same as actual (so-called equally distributed equivalent, EDE), and ξμ −  is the loss of 
income per capita due to loss of earning incentives. What part of the total income would an SDM be 
ready to sacrifice to achieve his goal? The answer is given by index of income inequality, I : 
μ
ξ
μ
ξμ −=−= 1I           (23) 
In our specific case of S-Gini social welfare function, we have that ( )νξ W=  and ( )νGI = , where 
( )νG  is the S-Gini index of income inequality, defined in section 2: 
( ) ( )μ
νν WG −=1           (24) 
B. Statistical inference 
As the values of all indicators are estimated from samples, we need to check their statistical 
significance. Anderson et al (2003) used the following bootstrap sampling procedure to estimate 
confidence intervals for the Suits index. There are three stages of sampling; we name the resulting 
samples the 1st, 2nd and 3rd stage samples. The first stage is the drawing of a representative sample 
from the population; we assume this has already been done. Using the data from the original or 1st 
stage sample, estimates of various indicators are obtained. Call 1Vˆ  and 2Vˆ  the estimates of one such 
indicator in periods 1 and 2, and 21 ˆˆˆ VVD −=  their difference. From the original sample, a certain 
number N of 2nd stage samples, of the same size as the original sample, are drawn randomly with 
replacement. Vectors [ ]*1*11*1 ,..., Nvvv =  and [ ]*2*21*2 ,..., Nvvv =  contain bootstrap replications of the 
desired measure for each of these N samples in periods 1 and 2. Let the difference between the values 
in the two periods be *2*1* vvd −= . The bootstrap standard error of Dˆ  is obtained as: 
( )2
1
**
1
1ˆ ∑= −−= Ni i ddNσ          (25) 
where ∑ == Nj jdNd 1 ** 1 . In the third stage, from each of the N samples, M new samples are drawn 
randomly with replacement, all of the same size as the original sample. Let [ ]**1,**11,**1 ,..., Miii vvv =  and 
[ ]**2,**21,**2 ,..., Miii vvv =  be the vectors of M bootstrap replications of the desired measure obtained, for 
samples drawn from ith 2nd stage sample, in periods 1 and 2, and let 
[ ]**2,**1,**2**1** ,..., Miiiii ddvvd =−=  be their difference. Then the bootstrap standard error for each 
of the 2nd stage samples (i=1…N) is equal to: 
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( )2
1
****
,
*
1
1ˆ ∑ = −−= Mj ijii ddMσ         (26) 
where ∑ == Mj jii dMd 1 **,** 1 . The bootstrap t-statistic for each of the 2nd stage samples is equal to 
( ) ** ˆ/ˆ iii Ddt σ−= . Let αt  and α−1t  be the α th and ( α−1 )th quantiles of the vector [ ]Nttt ,,1 Κ= . 
Then the ( )α−1100  percent confidence interval for D  is given by [ ]σσ αα ˆˆ,ˆˆ 1 tDtD −− − . The null 
hypothesis 0:0 =DH  can be rejected in favor of 0:1 ≠DH  only if lower and upper bound of the 
confidence interval both have the same sign. Note that the methodology requires that N be at least 
1,000 and M at least 25. 
C. Descriptive statistics of income, allowances and tax  
 1997 2004 
 Whole sample Sample without pensioners Whole sample 
Sample without 
pensioners 
Total pre-tax income* 49,689 40,129 96,957 70,931 
Wages and salaries 35,065 35,065 63,003 63,003 
Pensions 9,007 0 23,209 0 
Self-employment income 3,150 3,105 5,035 4,903 
Income from part-time and 
contractual work 1,875 1,549 2,461 2,048 
Rental income 592 417 1,624 1,051 
Dividends 0 0 1,722 0 
PIT 6,101 5,938 7,916 7,219 
Pre-tax income** 
mean 24,226 29,269 37,294 45,685 
standard deviation 24,773 27,722 52,616 51,428 
25th percentile 10,276 13,733 15,605 20,451 
median 17,711 23,932 27,061 36,635 
75th percentile 31,498 37,446 47,405 58,929 
Post-tax income 
mean 21,251 24,938 34,249 41,035 
standard deviation 18,513 20,291 41,773 38,693 
25th percentile 10,106 13,012 15,520 20,098 
median 16,867 21,616 26,510 34,782 
75th percentile 27,989 32,559 44,654 54,249 
Personal allowance 
mean 11,178 10,805 20,258 20,230 
standard deviation 5,749 5,433 11,361 11,504 
Other allowances 
mean 94 99 1,885 2,843 
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standard deviation 1,583 1,834 10,865 13,732 
Tax base 
mean 12,953 18,365 15,150 22,612 
standard deviation 23,382 26,000 46,882 43,597 
Gross tax 
mean 94 99 3,050 4,654 
standard deviation 6,894 7,997 12,716 14,778 
Tax credits 
mean 0 0 5 5 
standard deviation 0 0 230 270 
Net tax 
mean 2,974 4,331 3,045 4,649 
standard deviation 6,894 7,997 12,709 14,770 
* million kuna; ** in kuna 
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